Series → #relayerless-privacy
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Relayerless privacy on a Turing-complete L1: an intro to F_RP
A series-opening map of the relayerless full-privacy framework I've been writing up. Five cryptographic games, four constructions (SPST, PPST, TAB, UPEE), one main theorem — and why it matters that the target chain is Solana.
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The fee paradox: why every smart-contract privacy mixer needs a relayer
On account-model chains the very act of paying a transaction fee deanonymises the recipient. This post formalises the paradox, walks through three resolutions, and sets up the SPST construction that resolves it inside the ZK proof itself.
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SPST: a self-paying shielded transaction model
First construction in F_RP. The SPST relation, balance conservation under DLOG, double-spend resistance under collision-resistant PRF, unlinkability under DDH, simulation-extractable non-malleability.
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PPST: extending SPST to arbitrary private computation
F_RP Construction II. Generalises SPST to private programmable state: arbitrary arithmetic circuits over committed pre/post-state, with R1CS-embedded program execution and atomic PPST-SPST composition.
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TAB: hiding the submitter with ring signatures and FROST
F_RP Construction III. ZK proofs hide the contents but the wrapping Solana tx still leaks the submitter pubkey. TAB closes that gap with a Fujisaki-Suzuki ring signature and a FROST threshold Schnorr over Ed25519.
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Bayer-Groth verifiable shuffles for network-layer privacy
F_RP Construction III, Approach C. Bayer-Groth verifiable shuffles obscure the input→output permutation of a batch with O(√n) proof size — used to cascade-mix pre-broadcast batches at the network layer.
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UPEE: composing SPST + PPST + TAB into one framework
F_RP Construction IV. The five-algorithm tuple Setup/Deploy/Invoke/Verify/Finalize plus the simulation-based privacy theorem (3.12) and self-sovereignty theorem (3.13). The composition that makes the whole thing deployable.
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Fitting F_RP in 656 bytes on Solana
Concrete F_RP instantiation on Solana. Groth16 over BN254, Poseidon Merkle, indexed nullifier tree, BN254 Pedersen, transaction in 656 of 1,232 bytes, 235K of 1.4M CU.
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F_RP vs Zcash, Tornado, RAILGUN, Aztec, Penumbra, Aleo, Namada, Monero
F_RP vs nine deployed privacy systems on the four axes that matter: relayer-free, Turing-complete, on-chain verifiable on a high-perf L1, low-trust setup.
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MEV resistance: why UPEE is sandwich-proof by construction
Theorem 7.3 — UPEE transactions resist sandwich/frontrun/liquidation MEV by construction. Theorem 7.4 — block MEV bounded by public-bit leakage, not transaction value. Independent of V, not super-linear.